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MANAGING STRAINS IN THE COALITION: What to do about Saddam?

Stephen C. Pelletiere

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**MANAGING STRAINS IN THE COALITION:
WHAT TO DO ABOUT SADDAM?**

Stephen C. Pelletiere

November 15, 1996

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FOREWORD

Since 1991 the international community has imposed and sustained an impressive constellation of measures to bottle up the Iraqi regime—an oil embargo, other economic sanctions, intrusive inspections, two “no-fly” zones, and the Kurdish “safe-haven” in northern Iraq. For its part, Iraq has opted to “tough it out” rather than fulfill the cease-fire conditions that ended the Gulf War. The stalemate has devolved into a test of wills, with Saddam Hussein betting that the discipline of his Ba’th Party cadres will outlast the unity of the coalition arrayed against him.

For 5 years U.S. policy has managed to steer a coalition of states which share broad interests in regional stability and free trade. Yet below these common interests, the United States has walked a tightrope stretched between competing objectives *vis-a-vis* Iraq, e.g., undermining Saddam while preserving Iraq as a counterweight to Iran; protecting the Kurds while not promoting their independence. Time, however, has a habit of eroding international coalitions and exposing seams in the details of policy. Iraq’s September 1996 actions in the Kurdish north found such a seam in coalition objectives, or, to return to the original metaphor, shook one anchor of the U.S. policy tightrope.

This study by Dr. Stephen Pelletiere examines how the Kurdish crisis developed, why—most disturbingly—the key coalition members divided in response to U.S. actions, and what factors might guide future U.S. policy. He concludes that U.S. policy needs reanchoring if we are to achieve our paramount interests in this vital region.

Richard H. Witherspoon
RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

STEPHEN C. PELLETIERE received his Ph.D. in International Politics from the University of California, Berkeley. In the early 1960s he served in the Middle East as a foreign correspondent during which time he was based in Beirut. Dr. Pelletiere returned to the Lebanese capital in 1970, for a stay at Shemlan, the Arabic language school of the British government. In 1975, when the Lebanese civil war erupted, Dr. Pelletiere was in Cairo, Egypt, conducting research on a Fulbright Fellowship. He interviewed refugees fleeing Lebanon to Egypt, including many United Nations professionals. Dr. Pelletiere has taught at the University of California, Berkeley; at Ripon College, in Wisconsin; and at Union College, Schenectady, NY. From 1982 until 1987 he was an intelligence officer in Washington monitoring the Iran-Iraq War. He came to the Strategic Studies Institute in 1988, and became a full professor in 1992. He has written two books on the Middle East: *The Kurds-An Unstable Element in the Gulf*, and *The Iran War-Chaos in a Vacuum*.

MANAGING STRAINS IN THE COALITION: WHAT TO DO ABOUT SADDAM?

America's Role.

Since before World War I, the West has been interested in the Persian Gulf. Originally, Great Britain dominated the region. The British regarded the area as part of their sphere of interest. London particularly feared the penetration of some foreign power into the Gulf, from which it would threaten India, the crown jewel of Britain's empire.

In the 19th century, Britain's fears had focused on Russia. But this soon shifted to fear of Germany, as the empire of Kaiser Wilhelm built the Berlin-to-Baghdad Railway, to terminate in the northern Gulf. To neutralize the German advance, Britain cultivated the petty sheikhs who lived along the Gulf littoral.¹ It offered them subsidies if they, in turn, would agree not to alienate any of their territory to a foreign power. In this way, the British hoped to prevent the Germans from setting up a base and bringing troops into the region.

Then, in the early 1900s, oil was discovered in Iran, and Britain moved quickly to sew up concessions.² For a time, Great Britain seemed to be the predominant power in the area, until American oil companies began to operate there.³ At that, Britain was forced to share its influence with Washington. Nonetheless, until the late 1960s Britain was the major power in this part of the world. Washington acted as a silent partner, backing up the British, but generally letting London take the lead in directing affairs.

This condominium arrangement persisted until 1969, when the British announced that they could no longer guard the Gulf. Their economy was too weakened from having suffered through two World Wars. Thus it was that the United States took over, effectively becoming the Gulf's policeman. Western influence over the Gulf—and, by extension, over the international oil industry—was

challenged immediately after Britain departed the Middle East. This occurred with the outbreak of the Third Arab-Israeli War, and the tremendous increase in oil prices that accompanied that conflict.

The Arab Oil Embargo took power away from the oil-consuming countries—mainly Great Britain and the United States—and transferred it to the oil producing states, mainly the Arab oil producers (and Iran), all of which were affiliated with the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Initially, under OPEC's direction, oil prices pursued a trajectory steadily upward. They went from less than \$3 a barrel to more than \$24 a barrel immediately after the 1973 War, and they rose again with the overthrow of the Iranian Shah in 1979. Then the market steadied once more, largely due to intervention by the United States.

The United States worked out a special relationship with Saudi Arabia. The Saudis, who have the greatest reserves of oil in the world, agreed to cooperate with the West to ensure that prices would be kept within reasonable limits (reasonable, that is, by Western standards).⁴ The Saudis would endeavor to keep prices low and that would keep inflation down, a boon to the industrialized states. At the same time they would strive to maintain prices at a high enough level so that the oil producers could benefit.⁵

In return for cooperation with the West's financial markets, the Saudis got protection. Originally, this was against alleged menaces from the Soviet Union. But even before the fall of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the nature of the protection had changed.

In the late 1970s, with the rise of Khomeini in Iran, the lower Gulf trembled before the specter of militant Islam. Then the Iraqis went to war with Tehran, and that seemed to check Iran's growing power. However, Iraq's assault on Iran soon faltered, and Arab and Western aid were required to sustain Baghdad in a lengthy stalemate. Before the Iran-Iraq War had ended, the United States was covertly assisting the Iraqis to turn back the Iranian tide.

Errata

P. 3, lines 1-3: Should read "When Iraq defeated Iran, a new danger to stability in the Gulf occurred, as in 1990 Iraqi forces overran neighboring Kuwait."

When Iran defeated Iraq, a new danger to stability in the Gulf occurred, as in 1990 Iraqi forces overran neighboring Kuwait. The United States then assembled one of the great coalitions of all time, which ousted the Iraqi army from Kuwait, and imposed military and economic sanctions on Baghdad which continue to this day.

Why was the United States able to form such a powerful union of states against Saddam Hussein? Because, in the eyes of most the world's countries—and this was particularly true of the industrialized nations—what the United States was doing was necessary to fulfill its role as guardian of the Gulf. By restoring the sovereignty of Kuwait, Washington sustained the operation of the international oil trade, on which Western economies depended.⁶

However, in the aftermath of Operation DESERT STORM, revolt erupted in the Iraqi Kurdish regions. When the Iraqi army moved to suppress this uprising, thousands of Kurds fled to the mountains of neighboring Turkey, precipitating a humanitarian crisis. Washington mounted Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, which subsequently was expanded to provide a safehaven for the Kurds. At this point, formerly firm allies of the United States began draw apart from it, distancing themselves from the U.S. effort to help the Kurdish minority.

The former Soviet Union, for example, evidenced deep concern over the U.S.-sponsored operation. Like Baghdad, Moscow is bedeviled by fractious minorities, seeking to break free and form their own states. Thus, the Russians were not in favor of restricting a government's right to exercise authority within its own borders.⁷

France, too, was not altogether pleased with Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. On the one hand, the French strongly supported the Kurds.⁸ But, during the Iran-Iraq War, Paris had been Baghdad's primary weapons supplier. After the war, it expected to be rewarded for this aid with oil concessions. To the extent that Operation PROVIDE COMFORT prevented Iraq from rehabilitating itself, it hurt

French chances of obtaining economic rewards from the Iraqis.

Turkey, too, was against Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. It viewed the Kurds as a dangerous element. The Kurds are smugglers, an occupation they have pursued for centuries. Once the safehaven was set up, the Turks expected the Kurds to take advantage of it to carry on—and expand—their illicit activities.⁹

Further, the Turks have a large Kurdish population of their own, which, they feared, would fall in with the lawless element in Iraq.¹⁰ The anarchy there would spread across the border into Turkey, with nothing to stop the movement since Iraq's security forces could not operate above the 36th parallel, a constraint imposed by the Allies on Baghdad. Iraqi Kurdistan would become a smugglers' paradise, the Turks felt.

Finally, many of the Arab states doubted the wisdom of separating the north of Iraq from Baghdad's control. This would weaken the regime, and dangerously skew the power balance in the area toward Iran—something that no Arab government wished to see.¹¹

All of this is to say that the establishment of the safehaven in northern Iraq did not enjoy the kind of support that Operation DESERT STORM had engendered. It was not widely reported in the West, but in many quarters the United States' newfound policy of protecting the Kurds had few regional adherents.

Moving Toward Rupture.

In 1991 an incident occurred which buttressed the coalition partners' misgivings about Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. The safe haven had just been established under the direction of the two principal Kurdish leaders, Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani. Barzani was the spokesman for the northern Kurds, roughly all of those around Zakho and Dohuk, and Talabani, the southern Kurds from around Sulaimaniyah.¹² (See Figure 1.)




Figure 1. The Kurdish Area in Iraq.

In May 1991 Saddam Hussein made an offer of autonomy to the Kurdish leaders.¹³ This was a renewal of a proposal the Iraqi government had tendered to the Kurds in 1970.¹⁴ It was, in many ways, an attractive plan. Indeed, the leader of the Kurdish community in 1970, Mulla Mustafa Barzani (the father of Masoud), nearly accepted the offer, but ultimately he rejected it, choosing instead to return to war against Baghdad.¹⁵ Now, in 1991, Masoud Barzani was tempted to enter into a compact with Saddam, but his colleague, Talabani, balked at this. Ultimately Barzani came around to Talabani's way of thinking. During the negotiations with Baghdad, Washington and London behaved as if they disapproved of the talks, and afterwards both appeared relieved the deal was not consummated.¹⁶

Why did the United States and Britain—the principals supporting Operation PROVIDE COMFORT—object to the Kurds' coming to terms with Iraq? Was not the aim of the United Nations (U.N.) resolution, under which the safe haven had been created, to develop a *modus vivendi* between the Kurds and the central government? If the United States did not want to see the parties reconciled, what was the point of the exercise in the north?

Turkey feared that Washington policymakers had a secret agenda; that undercover they were working towards the formation of an independent Kurdish state.¹⁷ The Turks were appalled by this prospect, since, as far as they were concerned, any such development would be unworkable. That Washington could not appreciate this fact was profoundly troubling to the Turks.

Ankara sought and got assurances from the United States that it would uphold the sovereignty of Iraq, and not permit the Kurds to break away from the control of Baghdad.¹⁸ But that was all it got. It could not, for example, discover where events in the north were headed; and in particular, how long the safehaven was likely to be kept in place.

Meanwhile, U.N. relief organizations had begun to enter the north of Iraq, bringing much needed supplies.¹⁹ The two

major Kurdish factions—the Barzanis and Talabanis—began to organize life in the north, and then in 1992 the Kurds elected a Parliament.²⁰ This development rekindled fear in Ankara of a move toward statehood. The United States reassured the Turks that it viewed Operation PROVIDE COMFORT as purely a humanitarian effort, with no political overtones beyond precluding Iraqi military predations in the north.

Aid for the Kurds came primarily from the United States, the United Nations, and from some nongovernmental organizations. There was not a lot of money available, but enough to support Barzani and Talabani, and to pay their retainers, including the so-called *pesh mergas* (selfless ones), who make up the leaders' personal bodyguard.²¹ As for the rest of the Kurds, they had to make do as best they could. This produced widespread dissatisfaction, as the mass of Kurds had expected the American-sponsored operation to bring them some employment.

The Kurds had expected to see an extensive bureaucracy develop in the north, to run the area. But, as long as Washington ruled out a separate state for the Kurds, this was impossible. The smuggler Kurds, those lawless elements, could survive without a government; however, the city Kurds, who had no independent means of support, suffered.²² For them, one of the few options they had was to become *pesh mergas*, serving either Barzani or Talabani.

It was perhaps the proliferation of retainers, who had to be provided for, that led to a breakdown of Kurdish society. As the demands upon the Kurdish leaders grew, they cast about for additional sources of income. Barzani, for example, began collecting a tax from Turkish truck drivers hauling contraband across the northern Iraqi-Turkish border.²³ This “customs” operation was quite lucrative, and netted Barzani upwards of \$250,000 a day. When Barzani refused to share this revenue with Talabani, the latter seized the Kurdish capital of Irbil, and along with it the “state” treasury.²⁴ With that, Kurdish society exploded into civil war.

To try to compose this dissension, the United States called a number of conferences among the Kurds, but none were successful. The scenario always was the same—the Kurdish chiefs would agree to mend their differences, but then would return to their home bases and promptly resume their warfare. U.S. policymakers seemed not to appreciate what was at the root of the difficulty, namely that without some formal declaration of status, Kurdish society was in limbo. The Kurdish leadership could not raise funds from the international lending community; it could not go to Baghdad for assistance, and the U.S. Congress was unable—or unwilling—to appropriate sufficient aid. There needed to be a resolution of the situation, something that would end the drift that was destroying Kurdish morale.

Meanwhile, conditions in the north continued to deteriorate. The relief agencies began to pull out of the region, being unable to guarantee the safety of their staffs. The Kurds wanted jobs and expected the relief agencies to fire regular employees in order to take them on the payroll. Some relief workers were seized and held as hostages until ransoms were paid.²⁵ Effectively, the Kurdish region was doubly oppressed because, once the relief workers cut down their operations, available assistance was inadequate. In Baghdad's view, the Kurds' action in separating from the central government absolved it of any obligation towards them.

It was probably inevitable that resentment towards the United States would increase. To many Kurds, it was inexplicable that Washington did not step in to at least end the civil war. Bitter accusations against Washington and London, the upholders of the safehaven, began to be expressed.²⁶ I believe that the U.S. failure to act was due to an incorrect assessment of conditions inside Iraq. U.S. policymakers apparently believed that Saddam could not last much longer. His people were suffering under the most draconian sanctions imposed upon a nation since World War I. His army was short of equipment. There had been one significant defection from the ruling clique, and at least one serious tribal disturbance.²⁷

Therefore, despite appeals to act, Washington stood its ground, believing that the trouble would soon be over. U.S. policymakers had convinced themselves that Saddam's days were numbered, and that, once he fell, a new pro-Western regime would set things to rights. The problem with this strategy was that it underestimated the Iraqi Ba'th Party.

The faction that represents Ba'thism in Iraq is the best organized and disciplined party among the Arabs, if not in the entire Middle East.²⁸ Having sustained itself in power since 1968, and survived what seemed at one time to be a ruinous war with Iran, the party is used to handling crises. As this one deepened, the Ba'thists tightened their control. The Iraqi people, experiencing the pressure, went along with the party's dictates.

States in the area, who knew the Ba'th, did not find this discipline surprising. But, in Washington the attitude of watchful waiting persisted, as the conviction remained that Saddam's days were surely numbered.²⁹ In the meantime, a new, and unexpected development—inside Turkey—complicated the picture.

The Mystery of the PKK.

One of the abiding mysteries of Kurdish society involves the activities of a group called the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). This is made up of Turkish-Kurds who oppose the Ankara government. The PKK advertises itself as a separatist organization, meaning that it would like to detach the southeastern Kurdish region from the rest of Turkey. At the same time, however, the PKK leaders are vague as to what sort of society would be set up once the separation was complete.³⁰ The PKK was, at one time, a self-proclaimed Marxist outfit.

What is puzzling about the PKK is the numbers of Kurds who supposedly are adherents to its cause. Starting in 1991, after Operation PROVIDE COMFORT came into existence, the media—here and in Europe—began citing membership figures in the thousands. This, despite the fact that—as late as 1988—the party could not have claimed two hundred

members, in toto. Indeed, among Kurdish militant groups the PKK is a late bloomer, so to speak. It did not become a group of consequence until 1984.³¹

I believe the PKK's phenomenal growth was not due to ideological conversion on the part of a mass of Turkish Kurds, but rather to something else. After the Kurdish rebellion in northern Iraq—which accompanied the wind-down of Operation DESERT STORM and the announcement by the United States that it would mount Operation PROVIDE COMFORT—Syria and Iran became alarmed over what they perceived to be NATO penetration of the region.

Syria and Iran have always suspected the link between Turkey and the United States through NATO.³² They view any move by Washington and Ankara in the northern Gulf as a NATO-inspired intrigue, and they try to resist such moves, however they can. In particular, Damascus and Tehran condemned Turkey's agreement to allow the allies to use Incirlik Air Base in southeastern Turkey as a staging area for flights over northern Iraq.³³ The Iranians, in particular, were fearful that the Allies would fly surveillance missions from there over Iranian territory.

I believe that Tehran and Damascus exploited what then was an insignificant organization, the PKK, to counter Operation PROVIDE COMFORT.³⁴ The Syrians and Iranians distributed money inside the safe haven, and this bought them mercenaries, or rather *pesh mergas*. These individuals undertook operations against the Turks. Shortly after Operation PROVIDE COMFORT commenced, the PKK (or, at least, individuals claiming to be adherents of the PKK) began attacking Turkish troop installations in southeastern Turkey from bases the organization had set up just over the border in Iraq.³⁵

There was great deal of publicity over these attacks, and, unfortunately for the Turks, this was instrumental in holding up Ankara's bid to join the European Economic Community.³⁶ Investigatory missions were dispatched from Brussels to examine conditions among the Turkish Kurdish

minority in southeastern Anatolia. This seems to have provoked demonstrations on the part of Kurdish militants, who sought to embarrass the Turkish government.³⁷

Turkey reacted in two ways. First, it cracked down hard on the militants, and this, of course, created a renewed storm of disapproval in Europe.³⁸ But it also cited the existence of the PKK, and the unrest that it was provoking in the southeast, as proof that the safehaven was a destabilizing element in the region.

This drew a declaration from Washington that it regarded the PKK as a terrorist group, and that the United States sympathized with Turkey's need to suppress the organization. Meanwhile, Turkish commandos had begun conducting cross-border raids into Iraq, to root out the PKK cadres.³⁹ At least this was the announced intent. In fact, I believe that Turkey used the PKK as a pretext to intervene in the north, which under international law it was prevented from doing.

I do not believe Turkey—despite its protestations about the PKK—was seriously threatened by the organization, at least not in 1992. But the Turks were convinced that the situation in northern Iraq was fraught with peril, and that, unless checked, it would soon get out of control. Specifically, the Turks feared that the Iraqi Kurdish region was developing into a power vacuum, since there was no authority capable of imposing order there.

Hence, the cross-border raids were a means the Turks employed to impose their authority over the region. The tactic of the raids was ingenious, because it enabled the Turks to satisfy both the United States and themselves. They were able to go on cooperating with Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, which the United States wanted, and yet they could simultaneously intervene in the safehaven to curb the Kurds whenever they saw fit. It is also likely that the Turks cleared the raids with the Iraqis in advance. Iraq and Turkey had cooperated on a similar scheme during the Iran-Iraq War.⁴⁰ In the mid-1980s, the Iranians had tried to create a second front against Iraq,

using the Barzani and Talabani Kurds. Ankara and Baghdad worked out an agreement whereby Turkey was empowered to cross over into the Iraqi Kurdish region to suppress the pro-Iranian guerrillas. This arrangement probably spared Iraq defeat in the war.

Now, in the 1990s, the Turks were helping the Iraqis once again. They were repressing the lawlessness of the Kurds, and preventing the north from achieving de facto independence. The raids did this by drawing attention to the unstable conditions there, and underscoring the fact that the Kurdish leadership could not control the area.

In any event, the cross-border raids are chiefly of interest for the response they evoked from Iran. Iran never repudiated the PKK as a client-organization, or stopped supporting that group, but it began to branch out, as it were. Rafsanjani, Iran's president, summoned the leaders of the two opposing Iraqi Kurdish factions to Tehran. There, he announced that Iran would mediate the leaders' dispute.⁴¹ Nothing of substance came out of the conference, but it was shortly after this that Talabani began to behave as a client of Tehran.⁴² At the same time, Barzani moved over into the camp of the Turks.⁴³ Thus, it seems likely that by early 1995 America and Britain had lost control of their Iraqi Kurdish clients, and things then began to move at a fast pace toward the crisis of this past September.

The Crisis Erupts.

The incident which touched off the crisis occurred on July 29, 1996, when Iranian Revolutionary Guards crossed into Iraqi Kurdistan, ostensibly hunting Iranian Kurdish guerrillas, who (the Iranians claimed) use the area as a base against Iran.⁴⁴ This almost certainly was a deception. The Revolutionary Guards went into northern Iraq to assist Talabani in his fight against Barzani. They penetrated 50 kilometers into the interior and left arms for Talabani as they departed. Why at this moment did the Iranians decide to make such a potentially disruptive move?

My feeling is that they were upset by the U.N. decision to allow Iraq to sell oil, for they saw in this concession the beginning of the end of the economic embargo against Iraq.⁴⁵ By bringing aid to Talabani, the Iranians were positioning themselves to strike at the oil pipeline through which Iraqi oil was to move to the world markets. (See Figure 1.)

The Talabani guerrillas equipped with Iranian-supplied weapons—and more than likely directed by Revolutionary Guards left behind in Iraq—would interdict the flow of oil through the pipeline, frustrating Iraq's hopes of getting out from under the embargo to begin its recovery.

A number of points can be made about this raid. First, the U.S. reaction was remarkably restrained.⁴⁶ It is likely the U.S. policymakers did not appreciate the seriousness of what Iran had done. Indeed, it is probably the case that the Americans equated the Iranian raid with the other earlier raids by the Turks, which never seemed to come to anything—at least the Iraqi government never felt provoked to retaliate.

The difference, however—as pointed out above—was that Turkey conducted its raids almost certainly with Iraqi acquiescence, and the raiding constituted, therefore, a form of aid to Iraq, keeping the northern area under control, which the Iraqi government was prevented from doing because of U.S.-imposed restraints.

Another point is the effect of the raid on Turkey. Turkey was eager to see the oil deal which Iraq had brokered with the United Nations consummated, as Turkey stood to benefit financially from it. It would gain revenue from transit fees—since the oil moved to market through a pipeline which crossed Turkish territory—and, in addition, Turkey had worked out separate deals with Baghdad to sell it food and other necessities.⁴⁷

Turkey would not have been misled by Iranian protestations that they were only going after anti-Tehran guerrillas. It would have subjected the operation to keen scrutiny, and Turkey would have seen that this was a threat to its interests.

Iraq would also have seen the operation for what it was—a potentially lethal strike at its sovereignty, which—unless countered—could signal the breakup of the state.⁴⁸

Finally, Barzani would have seen that his position was undercut by his rival Talabani receiving arms and technical assistance from Tehran.

It is my belief that this move of Iran into northern Iraq was a blunder. The rapidity with which the anti-Tehran coalition (Turkey, Barzani, and Iraq) responded indicates prior planning. These three must have contemplated some such move on Iran's part and been set to counter it.

One mystery is who initiated the prior planning: Turkey, Iraq, or Barzani? Barzani is a likely candidate, since he had a grudge against the West, in general, and the United States, in particular. This dates back to the mid-1970s, when then-Secretary of State Kissinger betrayed Barzani's father, Mulla Mustafa Barzani—at least this is how Masoud Barzani views the matter. Kissinger abruptly withdrew U.S. support for Mulla Mustafa's anti-Baghdad revolt, prompting the Kurdish chief to flee to Iran with the remnants of his movement.⁴⁹

Mosoud Barzani also has the reputation of being a strategist, someone who plots every move and then does what is best for his interests. He does not act—as many Kurdish chiefs are reputed to do—on impulse. Thus, once he had determined that the Iranian move was harmful to him, he would have been receptive to any means of countering it.

At the same time, however, Barzani would not have had the temerity to devise anything so portentous as seizing Irbil. By doing that, he and Saddam defied Washington in the most blatant manner. There are penalties for such actions, which the Kurdish leader would not have been anxious to incur. It seems likely therefore that Barzani merely agreed to go along with the seizure, but someone else conceived the idea. Saddam is capable of such bold action. The Iraqi leader has a keen sense of Iraq's national interest and, were he to perceive that Iraqi integrity were threatened, would not hesitate to strike.

But, then, the Turks, too, are sensitive to such concerns, particularly the Turkish general staff. The Turkish generals consider themselves the guardians of the legacy of the founder of modern Turkey, Kemal Ataturk.⁵⁰ Ataturk decreed that Turkey must consider itself a satisfied *status quo* power. This meant that Ankara would uphold the state system in the region, renouncing all claims on its neighbors' territory, but, at the same time, expecting them to respect the balance of power.

Iran, by moving into northern Iraq, was maneuvering to drastically shift the balance in its favor, and therefore it is understandable that the generals would want to act. To be sure, an operation such as this—one which harmed the United States—could easily have backfired on Turkey. I do not believe this would have stopped the generals.

The Turkish *government* has to worry about the reaction Turkey's policies will have on Washington, but this not the case with the generals. Moreover, the generals could claim—with some justification—that the government's attempts to appease Washington have not born fruit. Turkey has seen the U.S. Congress slash its aid—it is all in the form of grants now, and the sum is relatively insubstantial.⁵¹ Further, the Turks have been outraged by what they perceive as the U.S. Congress' pandering to the Greek and Armenian lobbies. And finally, Washington promised to back Turkey's bid to enter the European Union, and so far that has not materialized.

I am not suggesting that the generals acted on their own, ignoring the civilian leadership. It is rather that the generals would have—in my estimate—taken the lead on this. Recognizing that Iran's penetration threatened the power balance, they would have endorsed a counter-stroke, and I don't believe that worries over how this would be received in Washington would have stopped them.

Now that the Iraqis and Barzanis have recaptured Irbil, Washington's position in the area is almost completely undercut. Whereas in the past the United States controlled events, now it is practically relegated to the sidelines. This

was evident in the most recent flare-up, where the Talabani forces—after having been driven completely out of Iraq—returned, with Iran's aid, to reconquer territory they had lost. For a time, it appeared that Iraq would come to Barzani's aid again, provoking a possible clash with the Iranians. American diplomats had to struggle mightily to restrain Talabani from making a drive on Irbil, and ultimately make him agree to a ceasefire. As of this writing, whether the fighting actually would cease was up in the air.

This counter-stroke by the Talabani faction is particularly worrisome, since it represents a significant escalation. All of the parties—Iraq, the Kurdish factions, Turkey and Iran—must now gauge how far they want to go with this. More than ever there is the possibility of a runaway war.

Summing up, as a result of this affair, Turkey, Iraq and Barzani have all been drawn into a coalition.⁵² Opposing them are Iran, Syria and Talabani. Most unfortunate, for the interests of the West, the influence of the United States and Britain has been seriously weakened. We are too close to events to predict how the affair will develop, but the situation seems certain to deteriorate further.

The U.S. Position.

American policy on Iraq has gone through three shifts of emphasis. First, the United States was in the Gulf to ensure the flow of oil to the world market, and no one—or few, at any rate—objected to that. Then, it was there to guard the safehaven for the Kurds, and support for this mission was thin at best. Most recently, U.S. policy seems to have been directed towards toppling Saddam Hussein, and—with the exception of Britain, Israel and Kuwait—no one has supported this approach; even some of the Gulf Cooperation Council states have opposed it.⁵³

Setting aside the issue of how this anti-Saddam shift came to be, a number of related issues should be taken into consideration.

First, I do not believe that Iraq could survive the disappearance of Saddam Hussein and the Ba'thists; it is far more likely that the country would fall apart. To those who believe the present regime could be dispensed with, I would propose the following analogy—it is like saying that we will keep the flesh, but abstract the skeleton out of the living form; the Ba'th is the skeleton that holds Iraq upright.⁵⁴

The reasons why the Iraqi people tolerate the Ba'th are many and complex. However, I would like to cite one probable cause—prior to the coming of the Ba'th, conditions in Iraq were almost anarchical. Regimes succeeded each other in a revolving door pattern, and each change of government was accompanied by dreadful purges. Having lived through the pre-Ba'thist days, the Iraqi people are not willing to see a government change, unless they know what new form of rule—or disrule—is to be visited on them.⁵⁵

Moreover, if there is not some strong regime in power in Baghdad, the country will become a prey to its neighbors—two of which have irredentist claims upon it.⁵⁶ To prevent Iraq's neighbors from exercising their claims, the United States would have to permanently occupy the country; otherwise there would be no defense against foreign takeovers.

We should not forget that, after Saudi Arabia, Iraq has the largest reserves of oil in the world, and that one of its richest fields is located on the edge of the Iraqi Kurdish region, in Kirkuk. This is precisely the area Iran was attempting to penetrate with its latest raid.

Without belaboring the point, it is important to keep in mind that the main justification for the U.S. military presence in the Gulf is to keep the oil flowing, and, to do that, Washington must promote stability. Present policy has not been conducive to this. In particular, efforts to overthrow the regime in Iraq have worked against it. It could be argued that America's present policy is undermining the very purpose for which it was set up.

Most of America's allies seem to have drawn this conclusion, and this is why they have been so chary about supporting Washington in the latest crisis. It is not that the allies favor the Ba'th, much less Saddam Hussein; rather they will not support a change of government in Iraq, unless there is an equally strong, well-organized, and disciplined regime available to take over. Washington's present candidate to rule Iraq after the Ba'th is the Iraqi National Congress. Few in the Middle East take this organization seriously.⁵⁷

The most disconcerting aspect of the recent crisis in Iraqi Kurdistan was the behavior of America's allies. Washington found it could not manage strains in the coalition. Suddenly, the coalition partners resisted Washington-directed moves against Baghdad. Jordan, Egypt, Turkey, and even Saudi Arabia all fought shy of this. And, when Washington asked the Security Council to condemn Iraq, Russia threatened a veto, if it were brought to a vote. That so much opposition arose is an indication of how strongly U.S. allies regard this issue.

Now, the United States proposes to shift its emphasis on Iraq once again—to Operation SOUTHERN WATCH from Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. It wants to use American air power to, in effect, deny Iraq control over almost half the country. There is much to recommend against this new policy.

Public Goods.

The original no-fly zones set up over northern and southern Iraq were never mandated by the United Nations. Rather this security regime was something imposed on the Iraqis by the victorious allies after the Gulf War.⁵⁸

At the time the zones were established, many felt the allies were taking matters too much into their own hands. Indeed, Washington never consulted the members of the Security Council before it took the step. Once the United States had the support of Britain and France, it simply went ahead.

This means that for Operation SOUTHERN WATCH to continue (and, indeed, to be expanded), there has to be a strong weight of moral authority on the side of Washington. There is no such consensus at the present time, and therefore Operation SOUTHERN WATCH is virtually a two-man show (Britain and the United States).⁵⁹

There is a further problem with Operation SOUTHERN WATCH: it is likely to result in an additional buildup of forces in the southern Gulf. Pious Muslims reject the American presence that is already there. They certainly will react adversely to the introduction of more troops, and their anger is liable to be translated into attacks on U.S. installations.⁶⁰ Ultimately, this could undermine the House of Saud.

However, the greatest danger is open defiance of the United States, which could come about at any time. The possibility is increasing that one of the major powers—France, Russia, or China—will turn against Washington, deciding unilaterally to break the economic embargo. This would constitute a stunning challenge to the U.S. world leadership role.

Effectively, then, the United States must have a new policy on Iraq, and the only way to proceed on this is to recognize that the Gulf constitutes a public good; that is to say, it is in the interests of all the world's nations to guard the oil coming out of the Gulf, and—recognizing this fact—it would be wise to coordinate efforts for bringing this about.

Put another way, the Gulf is an asset in which all the world's nations can claim a stake, and therefore whatever is done about it must be of benefit to all involved. Washington cannot unilaterally decide what is correct. In particular, it cannot take up immutable positions, such as that Saddam Hussein must go. Not all of our allies agree with the United States on this, and the more the United States insists on the rightness of its stand, the more coalition disharmony results.

And finally, the United States must confront the reality that the present strategy of trying to control Iraq by using

air power and missiles alone is not working. If the United States proceeds much farther on its present course, we will soon have to confront the need for ground forces. These cannot be employed without first having a great national debate, and that is something for which, it does not appear, the nation is ready.

ENDNOTES

1. At this time, none of the states that exist in the Gulf today were formed. Oil had not yet been discovered, and hence the whole region was impoverished. Subsequently, Britain oversaw the creation of all of the so-called Gulf Cooperation Council states (GCC) but Oman and Saudi Arabia. The United Arab Emirates (UAE), for example, was cobbled together by Britain in the 1970s out of six petty sheikhdoms.

2. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company (later BP) was the sole concessionaire in Iran until the 1950s. The British Admiralty owned 56 percent of this company. For details on how this acquisition was arranged see Anthony Sampson, *The Seven Sisters*, New York: Bantum Books, 1976.

3. After World War I, the United States retreated into a stance of isolationism. However, concurrently a scare developed that the country was running out of oil. This propelled American oil companies on a worldwide hunt for additional supplies. At this time, the Middle East had just begun to be developed as a major oil producing area. To gain entry into this region, the American companies sought the assistance of the federal government, and it is from this period that Washington and London set up the condominium arrangement for protecting Western interests in that part of the world. For details see Harvey O'Connor, *The Empire of Oil*, New York: The Monthly Review Press, 1955; Harvey O'Connor, *The World Crisis In Oil*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1962; Frank Hanighen, *The Secret War*, New York: John Day Co., 1934; Pierre l'Espagnol de la Tramerye, *The World Struggle For Oil*, New York: Alfred Knopf, 1924; Anton Mohr, *The Oil War*, New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1926; E. H. Davenport and Sidney Russell Cooke, *The Oil Trusts and Anglo-American Relations*, London: The Macmillan Co., 1924; and Francis DeLaisi, *Oil, Its Influence on Politics*, London: The Labor Publishing Co., 1923.

4. Oil, because of the nature of the industry, tends towards glut. In order to make it profitable, production has to be regulated. Before World War II, this regulation was carried on by the so-called Seven Sisters—Exxon, Mobil, Chevron, Gulf, Texaco, Royal Dutch Shell, and BP—which together effectively operated as a cartel. Under the

agreement the Saudis struck with the United States, the Saudis regulate their production to eliminate over-production, which would drive the price down, or, correspondingly, underproduction, which would send prices up. The Saudis can do this because they, alone among all the oil producing states, have the extensive reserves and modern facilities which enable them to adjust their production rapidly.

5. For discussions of Saudi cooperation with Washington to regulate oil prices, see "Saudi-U.S. Deal Suspected on Oil Price," *The Washington Post*, July 20, 1992; and "U.S. Tries to Influence Oil Prices, Papers Show," *The Washington Post*, July 21, 1992.

6. Two things would have happened had Baghdad held on to Kuwait. First, Iraq would have become the most formidable member of OPEC, and challenged Saudi dominance within that body. Second, it is likely that the sheikhs would have lost heart and taken their money to retire in Europe, which is effectively what the Kuwaiti elite did in the early days of the Iraqi invasion.

7. See "U.N. Tells Iraq to Halt Repression," *The Washington Post*, April 6, 1991; also "Soviets Reluctant to Back Wider U.N. Role in Iraq," *The Washington Post*, May 14, 1991.

8. France had at the time a Socialist government under Francoise Mitterand, and Mitterand's wife is one of the foremost supporters of the Kurdish cause in Europe.

9. For the smuggling activities of the Kurds, see Brian Sullivan, "International Organized Crime: A Growing National Security Threat," *Strategic Forum*, No. 74, May 1996; "Turks' War With the Kurds Reaches a New Ferocity," *The New York Times*, October 18, 1993; David McDowell, "The Struggle for Kurdistan," *Middle East International*, April 28, 1995; "Turks find way round sanctions on Baghdad," *The Financial Times*, December 8, 1994; "Balkan War Victor: Heroin," *The Washington Post*, November 6, 1993; "Boom and Embargo: Iraqi Smugglers Prosper Despite Tough U.N. Sanctions," *The Washington Post*, May 16, 1995; and "Heroin Pouring Through Porous European Border," *The New York Times*, February 9, 1993.

10. There are between 10 and 12 million Turkish Kurds, and about 2 1/2 to 3 million Iraqi Kurds, and then there are Kurdish communities in Iran and Syria as well.

11. See "Among the Arabs Little Enthusiasm," *The New York Times*, August 17, 1992; "Arabs Are Uneasy On Plan For Iraq," *The New York Times*, August 20, 1992; "Bush Faces Tricky Decisions in Trying to Get Tougher With Saddam Hussein," *The Wall Street Journal*, August 3, 1992; "Contrast in U.S. Policies Is Straining Alliance," *The Washington*

Post, September 19, 1992; "Moroccan Warns U.S. About Iraq," *The Washington Post*, September 6, 1992; "Behind the No-Fly-Zone Strategy; Dwindling Coalition Against Iraq," *The Christian Science Monitor*, September 1, 1992; "U.S. Has Trouble Maintaining Unity of Allies on Iraq," *The New York Times*, July 28, 1991; "America's Allies in Gulf War Shy about Bombing Iraq's Nuclear Facilities," *The Christian Science Monitor*, July 31, 1991; and "Jordan Rejects U.S. Request," *The Washington Post*, June 29, 1992. The Arabs regarded the Kurds as tools of the Iranians and Israelis. Many Arabs have never forgotten that the Kurds cooperated with attempts by the Shah of Iran and the CIA to topple the Iraqi Ba'thists. The Israelis also were active in this affair. For details on this, see Stephen Pelletiere, *The Kurds: An Unstable Element in the Gulf*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1984.

12. This is somewhat of a simplification. Barzani and Talabani are, effectively, warlords who dominate their respective regions, but this mainly came about because of their close ties to Washington and London. In fact, within both areas there are a number of powerful agas Kurdish chiefs, who acquiesced in following Barzani and Talabani, only because they were handsomely recompensed. See Stephen Pelletiere, *The Kurds and Their Agas: An Assessment of the Situation in Northern Iraq*, Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1991.

13. See "Why the Kurdish leaders went to Baghdad," *Middle East Insight*, May 3, 1991; "Kurdish Leader Reports Accord With Baghdad," *The New York Times*, May 19, 1991; and "Baghdad, Kurds Near Agreement," *The Washington Post*, May 19, 1991.

14. For details of the autonomy scheme, see Stephen Pelletiere, *The Kurds and Unstable Element in the Gulf*.

15. Mulla Mustafa Barzani gave as his reason for rejecting the offer that the autonomy plan was deficient, inasmuch as it did not include Kirkuk in the Kurdish region. However, Kirkuk is not predominantly Kurdish; it also has a large Turkoman population. Also, Kirkuk is the site of one of the world's richest oil fields, and the nationalist Ba'th regime would not concede that this might become a part of Kurdistan. It was also suggested that what Barzani really feared was that, under the plan, the Ba'thist imposed land reform would be extended into the Kurdish area. Had he gone along with this, Mulla Mustafa would have alienated all the tribal chiefs.

16. See "Barzani, Talabani Deny Differences," *FBIS-NES-91-128*, July 3, 1991; also for the background to the 1970 autonomy offer, see *The Kurds and Their Agas*. For apparent United States and British relief that the Kurds did not reconcile with Iraq, see "The US' failure in Iraq," *Middle East International*, October 4, 1996.

17. See "Key States Warn U.S. Over Kurds," *The Washington Post*, November 15, 1992.

18. See "Turkey Says Bush Rejects Kurdistan," *The New York Times*, September 4, 1992; "The Gulf Between Rhetoric and Reality," *Kurdish Life*, No. 10, Spring 1994; and "Turkish Leader to Press U.S. on Iraq Embargo," *The New York Times*, October 14, 1993.

19. The Kurds were already suffering, after having participated in a mass exodus to Turkey at the tail end of the Second Gulf War. Supposedly several hundred thousand participated in this mass flight.

20. In the election for this parliament, Barzani won but then "gave away" some of his votes so that the tally would be split evenly between Talabani and himself. Barzani maintained this was necessary, otherwise Talabani would not cooperate with the Kurdish authority. This kind of dissension was an early indication of trouble ahead.

21. The term *pesh merga* is an old one among the Kurds. It traditionally was meant to signify a personal retainer of an aga, a Kurdish chief. During Mulla Mustafa Barzani's revolt, the term gained wide currency by being publicized in the Western press. Today, the meaning is somewhat changed. Now it specifies anyone who is part of the leader's militia, in whatever capacity he serves. It has been estimated that today there are as many as 300,000 self-styled *pesh mergas*.

22. Under Ba'thist control of Iraq, the population was taken care of by state-supplied welfare programs. This system worked very well, even during the war, as the Ba'th maintained a policy of providing "guns and butter." It was only after the Second Gulf War, when the Ba'th had to relinquish control of the north, that many Kurds, who formerly were provided for by the state, were thrown on their own resources.

23. See "Kurdish hopes founder on warlords' rivalry," *The Financial Times*, February 9, 1995.

24. *Ibid.*

25. See "U.N. Warns of End to Kurdish Relief," *The New York Times*, May 23, 1993; and "Aid Workers in Kurdistan Fear Attacks," *The Washington Post*, July 8, 1993.

26. See "Desperate Kurds Consider Turning Once More to Saddam," *The Washington Post*, June 23, 1993; also the commentary in *Kurdish Life*, No. 13, 1995; "The State of the Kurds in the State of the Union," also "Kurdish hopes founder on warlords' rivalry," *The Financial Times*, February 9, 1995.

27. See "Iraq Reportedly Cracks Down on Clan That Tried a Coup," *The New York Times*, June 20, 1995; "U.S. Officials Say Evidence Confirms Reports of Fighting Between Iraqi Troops," *The Washington Post*, June 16, 1995; "Anti-Regime Riots, 50 Deaths Reported in Iraqi Province," *The Washington Post*, June 2, 1995; "A Failed Plot to Overthrow Hussein Is Reported in Iraq," *The New York Times*, March 14, 1995; "Senior Army Aides To Iraq President Defect To Jordan," *The New York Times*, August 11, 1995; "Baghdad 'Coup': An Assassination Bid?," *The New York Times*, July 9, 1992; "Saddam Said to Shuffle Military Command," *The Washington Post*, August 15, 1992; and "For Possible Coup in Iraq, U.S. Plans," *The New York Times*, December 11, 1991.

28. Ba'thism, as a political ideology, has manifested itself in two distinct forms. Syria's present government is Ba'thist, but it is vastly different from the Ba'thism that is present in Iraq. For a discussion of the development of Ba'thism and of the antagonism that exists between the two wings of the party, see Phebe Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1985; Christine Helms, *Iraq: Eastern Flank of the Arab World*, Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1984; and Marion Farouk-Slugget and Peter Slugget, *Iraq: Since 1958*, London: I.B. Tauris & Co., 1990. For a discussion of how the party managed to survive the crisis, see "Iraq's War Defeat, Civil Strife Causing Crisis in Baath Party," *The Washington Post*, July 16, 1992; and "Hussein Rebuilds Iraq's Economy, Undeterred by the U.N. Sanctions," *The New York Times*, June 23, 1993.

29. What certainly fed this optimistic outlook was the defection of Saddam's son-in-law. See Op-Ed comments in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* during this period.

30. The best treatment of the PKK, and of its ideological claims, is Michael Gunter, *The Kurds in Turkey*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1990.

31. For discussions of the status of the PKK in the period immediately preceding Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, see Stephen Pelletiere, *The Kurds and Their Agas*; and "Turkey and the United States in the Middle East: The Kurdish Connection," *Turkey's Strategic Position At the Crossroads of World Affairs*, Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1993.

32. *Ibid.*

33. This offer was also condemned by Turkey's general staff. However, Turkey's then President Turgut Ozal was able to force it through, largely because he was able to argue that, if Turkey did not do this, it would not be able to influence events in northern Iraq. This cost

Ozal dearly, however. His party was repudiated at the next election. He died soon after this.

34. Syria could be called the patron of the PKK. After the Turkish Army seized power from Turkey's civilian leaders in the mid-1970s, the PKK militants fled to Lebanon where Assad, in effect, took them under his wing. For details, see "The United States and Turkey: The Kurdish Connection," *Turkey's Strategic Position at the Crossroads of World Affairs*. For specific instances where Turkey has accused Syria and Iran of inciting the Kurds, see "Turks Move to Crush Rebellion," *The Washington Post*, October 5, 1992.

35. I am not implying, by any of this, that Operation PROVIDE COMFORT caused the PKK to come into being. The PKK, as an organization, goes back to the late 1960s. However, for most of its career it was an inconsequential group. During the late 1960s it was not much more than a street gang operating in Ankara and Isranbul. After that it was transplanted (by Syria) to the Beka'a Valley where its cadres were trained as terrorists. Then, during the Iran-Iraq War, it operated from a safehaven in northern Iraq controlled by the Barzani forces. It carried out some cross border raids into Turkey. At no point was the PKK a popular movement. If anything, it more closely resembled a cult, a Red Brigade-type operation. Its modus operandi focused on assassinations and bombings, mostly perpetrated in Europe and around the world (its specialty was assassinating Turkish diplomats). How was it able then to function as a guerrilla organization in one of the most inhospitable areas of the world, and how were the local Kurds persuaded to let it come among them? In Iraqi Kurdistan, no one can even move through an area without local permission, much less set up a guerrilla base and start attacking the Turkish army. As to the membership figures, they simply don't add up. Whereas before the creation of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT the PKK could not have had more than a few hundred members active in the area, after it the claim was made that the PKK enrolled upwards of 2,000. I fail to see how the PKK could have converted so many Turkish Kurds, when its professed ideology is Marxism. The Turkish Kurds were instrumental in ensuring victory for Turkey's Islamist Welfare Party in the last elections. For claims—mostly by the Turkish authorities—of Iranian backing for the PKK, see "Iran Implicated in Southeast Attacks, Talks Held; Reaction to Iran Allegations; Ozal: 'Terrorists From Iran,'" *FBIS-WEU-84-205*, October 22, 1984; "Turkey Warns Syria Over Aid to Armenians," *FBIS-MEA-83-058*, March 24, 1983; "Syrian Agents Helped Iran," *FBIS-MEA-83-151*, August 4, 1983; and "PKK Member Reveals Iranian Links With Terrorist Activity," *FBIS-WEU-93-140*, July 23, 1993.

36. See William T. Johnsen, "Turkey and Europe: Expectations and Complications," *Turkey's Strategic Position at the Crossroads of World Affairs*.

37. See "Turkey's Fight Against Kurds Embarrasses Ankara," *The New York Times*, September 5, 1992; "War on Kurds Hurts Turks in U.S. Eyes," *The New York Times*, November 17, 1994; "Kurds in Turkey Seem To Be Nearing Full-Scale Revolt," *The New York Times*, March 30, 1992; "Christopher Gives Turks Plan to End Rights Abuses," *The New York Times*, June 13, 1993; "Attacked in Turkey and Iraq, Kurds Become Focus of Diplomacy," *The Washington Post*, April 3, 1992; "Turkey's Efforts to Quell Rebel Kurds Raises Alarm in Ankara and Europe," *The New York Times*, March 27, 1992; "Defending Kurds, Bonn Cuts Arms Flow to Turkey," *The New York Times*, March 28, 1992; "Turkey's Pursuit of Kurds Disturbs Neighbors," *The Christian Science Monitor*, July 12, 1995; and "Jail deaths put Turkish rights record in spotlight," *The Financial Times*, July 26, 1996. The Turkish Kurds represent one fifth of Turkey's population, and therefore the threat from revived Kurdish nationalism to Turkey is real.

38. See "Torture in Turkey," *The New York Times*, July 20, 1992.

39. See "Turkey Sets Up Buffer In North Iraq to Curb Rebels," *The Washington Post*, August 8, 1992; and "Turks Attack Separatist Kurds in North Iraq," *The New York Times*, August 7, 1992.

40. For background on this, see Stephen Pelletiere, *The Iran-Iraq War: Chaos in a Vacuum*, Greenwood: Praeger, 1992.

41. See "Iraq-Chronology," *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 49, No. 4, Autumn 1995.

42. See *Kurdish Life*, No. 18, Spring 1996, for allegations that Talabani conspired with Iranian agents to kill two anti-Tehran Kurdish guerrillas in northern Iraq. Also see "Talabani Visits to Discuss Kurdish Peace," *FBIS-NES-95-184*, September 22, 1995.

43. This setup was only logical. Talabani's PUK, being based in southern Kurdistan, is surrounded by enemies, and therefore it must develop ties to Iran if it is to receive supplies. Similarly, Barzani, in the north, is practically hostage to the Turks.

44. See "Iran forces cross into Iraq to hit at Kurdish rebel group," *The Financial Times*, July 30, 1996.

45. The United States had turned back several moves by Russia and France to break the embargo, but at the same time U.S. diplomats sensed that this resistance could not be kept up much longer. These states were on the point of breaking the embargo unilaterally. Hence, early this year, Washington agreed to let Baghdad sell a specified amount of oil every two months and use the proceeds to relieve suffering among its population and pay war claims against the Iraqi state.

46. Washington did little more than warn Iran not to violate Iraq's sovereignty.

47. See "Turkey signs oil-for-food deal with Iraq," *The Financial Times*, August 16, 1996.

48. In fact, it does seem that that was what was on the point of happening. Just after Tehran launched the raid, Turkey announced that it was going to set up a security zone in northern Iraq, to make sure that PKK militants could not cross over into Turkey. I interpret this action as a shot across Iran's bow, letting the Iranians know that they must not think that they could take over in the north, that Turkey was prepared to contest them should they go ahead with any such plan.

49. See "The House Select Committee on Intelligence Report," the Pike Report published in *The Village Voice*, February 23, 1976.

50. For background on this, see George Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980.

51. See "Turkey Rejects U.S. Aid Loan," *The Washington Post*, June 7, 1996; "State Dept. Opposes Bill Cutting Turkish Aid," *The New York Times*, June 8, 1996; and "Turkey Used U.S. Arms In Suppression of Kurds," *The Washington Post*, June 2, 1995.

52. See "Article Views U.S. Initiative in Northern Iraq," *FBIS-WEU-95-149*, August 3, 1995.

53. See "Dubai asks lifting of Iraq sanctions," *The Boston Globe*, October 23, 1995.

54. Effectively, this is a condition of the omnipresence of the Ba'th. The party is organized in every area of Iraq down to the level of neighborhoods and villages. All of the military leaders above the rank of colonel are Ba'thists. The provinces of Iraq in every department are in the party's hands. To be sure, the party is not the power it once was. But its apparatus survives, and it is what runs the country.

55. For discussions of the ferocity that accompanied regime changes in Iraq prior to the Ba'th, see Phebe Marr, *The History of Modern Iraq*.

56. At the end of World War I, British troops seized Mosul after the armistice was signed between the Ottoman Empire and the victorious Allies. The Turks have always maintained that this was improper and have frequently raised the prospect that, were the area to disintegrate into anarchy, Turkey would repossess the north of Iraq. Similarly, Iran maintained a virtual sphere of interest over the predominantly Shia

areas of southern Iraq until the coming of the Ba'th. Moreover, the two holiest shrines of Shiadom, Najaf and Karbala, are in southern Iraq.

57. See the interview with Barzani in "Die CIA kann Saddam nicht sturzen," *Der Spiegel*, 39/1996.

58. The no-fly zones are so-called Chapter 6 actions of the United Nations. Unlike Chapter 7 actions, they are not enforceable. The economic embargo is a Chapter 7.

59. France has indicated that it is disinclined to participate in an expanded overflight of southern Iraq.

60. On the order of the two attacks on bases in Saudi Arabia which have already been perpetrated.

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